Being critical and practical
The underpinning mission of Culture: A Reformer's Science was to present and argue for a particular position in relation to the study of culture in general, and in relation to the field of cultural studies in particular. Specifically, Bennett (1998) argued that studies of culture could (and should) make a (more) valuable contribution by developing a pragmatics of analysis which would involve accounting for culture by engaging with the specific conditions of its management (p. 4). This 'engagement' should not simply be at the level of analysis but also, and it was perhaps this element more than any other that was controversial, Bennett advocated fostering practical working relationships with those who actually worked on cultural policy -cultural bureaucrats (p. 4). In this latter recommendation, Bennett was specifically critical of the tendency he identified in cultural studies for academics to identify themselves as unfettered by institutional conditions and therefore exclusively able to undertake 'pure' critique. 
L. Gibson
In presenting his argument 'towards a pragmatics for cultural studies', Bennett responded to some of the critiques directed at proponents of a pragmatic focus for cultural policy studies. The counter position to Bennett and others arguments for pragmatic engagements with the conditions of cultural governance (see, for instance, Hunter 1988 , Craik 1996 , Meredyth and Minson 2001 was put primarily on the basis that it was impossible to be both useful and critical (see O'Regan 1992 and McGuigan 1996 for sophisticated critiques). While Bennett (1998) comments that 'the tide has now turned considerably' and that working with the bureaucracy and on policy is less likely to be perceived as a 'sell-out' (p. 5), 10 years later, there is evidence that there is an ongoing anxiety in the cultural policy field about its relationship with the 'coal face' of cultural governance. We can see some of these anxieties manifest in the negotiation of concepts of 'critique' and 'practice' present in the debate on instrumentality at it has been played out in the pages of the International Journal of Cultural Policy and other cultural policy journals over the last five years or so (Gibson 2008) . These anxieties are perhaps even more present in discussions around value and evaluation, where the delineation of research categorised as 'advocacy' in comparison to 'critical' research is depressingly familiar, with the former deemed as the realm of consultants and the latter the exclusive realm of academics. Perhaps I am being overly schematic (but only a little) here, but the question of how to be both critical and practical is one which is as pertinent, and as unresolved, in contemporary cultural policy studies as it was 10 years ago.
Policy, power and politics
The power of Bennett's analysis of cultural governance lies in his bringing together of a particular range of theorists, such as Pierre Bourdieu especially in relation to cultural capital, Nikolas Rose in relation to technologies of power and Marcel Mauss in relation to conceptions of personhood. Bennett's approach is most influenced by Michel Foucault (1978) and particularly his identification in 'Governmentality' of the emergence of a new form of 'governmental' power (through cameralism, the science of police and eventually nineteenth-century liberal government) through which 'power is dispersed and applied through mechanisms which make the population an object as well as a subject of knowledge; and power itself, rather than being blazoned forth in an attempt to augment its effects in making them manifest, now also hides behind, or within, the processes of its own exercise' (Bennett 1998, p. 77) . Thus, for Bennett, cultural policies and programmes (which are not only mechanisms of the state) are 'technologies' which both make up particular subjects and categories of persons and, in doing so, provide new arenas and possibilities for being. This is far from the paranoid position which at times Bennett's work has been mistaken for. The possibilities of this argument are perhaps best summarised by drawing attention to Bennett's argument for the constructive and positive power of cultural technologies. For instance, in relation to the modern, more inclusive, museum:
is it not … true that the communities that the museum is to involve in dialogues are often the artefacts of its own activities rather than autochthonous entities which come knocking at the museum's door seeking rights of equal expression and representation? …. Are museums not still concerned to beam their improving messages of cultural tolerance and diversity as deeply into civil society as they can in order to carry that message to those whom the museum can only hope to address as citizens, publics and audiences? And do we not, through a battery of access policies, wish -indeed require -that they do so? (Bennett 1998, pp. 212-213) 
Conclusion
In this tiny space I've attempted to identify a couple of the key elements of Bennett's work that I have found helpful in thinking about my own work in cultural policy and which I believe are relevant to the field today. There are other important aspects I could have mentioned, not least Bennett's argument for understanding cultural governance in relation to its long history rather than in only immediately contextual terms. This is a theoretical position and methodological approach which I believe is necessary so that analysis does not take at face value discourses of self-evident value which are often brought into play in discussions of cultural institutions, programmes or practices. I hope that what I have achieved in this brief space is to identify a few of Bennett's arguments -engagement (but not necessarily agreement) with which, is, I believe, central to a critical and practical cultural policy studies.
